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Chapter 1
The extreme right in France: an enduring political tradition?
La politique, ce sont des idées.[1]
The far right in France is not the easiest political tradition to pin down and  comprehend  -
if it is in fact one single tradition at all. It is complex in  its  lineage,  chameleon-like  in  its
evolution and often contradictory in its discourse;[2] Winock argues that the extreme right
is ’a hard political tendency but a soft  concept’  (’une  tendance  politique  dure  mais  un
concept mou’).[3] Hainsworth, hinting at  the  rationale  behind  the  present  study,  says:
’France has experienced various cycles of extreme right-wing activity…sparking off much
debate about the nature and essence of this political family.’[4] Thus, we have to be  very
careful about the terms we use. Throughout this study we will utilise the terms ‘right’  and
‘extreme right’, but we must remember that any attempt to delineate  political  labels  and
categories will always be open to criticism.
Defining the right and extreme right
The words ’left’ and ’right’ are ’central to political debate’.[5]  It  is  customary  to  begin  a
study like this with a qualification that indicates both terms are inadequate, but also  quite
useful in the absence of any better nomenclature. And it would be sensible to  keep  faith
with  tradition  because  there   are   plenty   of   doubters   where   conventional   political
terminology is concerned. Sirinelli suggests that the left-right cleavage  is  almost  passé,
while O’Sullivan says the term ‘right’ is ’vague’ and ’unfocused’.[6]  Moreover,  O’Sullivan
and Winock argue that labels such as ’the right’ are prone to abuse and misuse, and it  is
difficult to disagree with this general point. [7]  Over time, the term  has  lost  much  of  its
value and integrity (in much the same way as ‘fascism’ has) but having said this it is clear
that the word ‘right’ has come to denote a series of definable  political  attitudes:  realism,
conservatism,  and  the  belief  in  established  authority  and  traditional  values  such  as
religion, monarchy and hierarchy.
      The language may be problematic – and even flawed – but it still has  wide  currency.
Rémond explains its enduring appeal:
Right, Left…the oscillation of these two terms, indissolubly linked  by  their  opposition,
paces by its rhythmic tempo all the political history  of  contemporary  France.  Men  of
the Right, men of the Left, parties of the Right, parties of the Left, Leftist  bloc,  Rightist
coalition, Right-Centre, Left-Centre,  the  persistent  hammering  of  these  twin  words
punctuates 150 years of political struggles…A fundamental principle of French political
life, this traditional division of  public  opinion  into  two  great  contrary  points  of  view
today remains the key which opens the door to an  understanding  of  France’s  recent
history. This history is bewildering and incoherent if left in  an  arbitrary  and  fortuitous
disorder.[8]
Rémond might have been writing in 1971, but his point retains validity today. How do  we
even  begin  to  understand  the  complexities  of  France’s  history  –  both  political   and
intellectual – without the aid of  the  ‘right-left’  political  spectrum  and  its  accompanying
vocabulary?
      As regards the present study, we are at something of an advantage because the term
‘right’ (just like the term ‘left’) does have innately French origins. It  was  during  the  early
years of the French  Revolution  that  the  distinction  emerged,  with  nobles  and  clerics
sitting on the right-hand side of the National Assembly, and representatives  of  the  Third
Estate sitting on the left.[9] Those on ‘the  right’  came  to  be  associated  with  efforts  to
preserve the King’s authority and the established social order and  in  time  with  counter-
revolution.  McClelland  says  the  French  right   ’attacked   rationality,   universality   and
democracy and in so doing worked  out  an  opposing  position  of  great  coherence  and
force.’[10]
      Many books have been written about the French right – as  distinct  from  the  right  in
general or the French far right –  and  it  would  be  fair  to  say  that  commentators  have
identified not just one  right-wing  tradition  in  France  but  many,  and  the  Revolution  is
invariably the starting point and key  reference  point.  McClelland  continues:  ’If,  as  the
right argued, all France’s troubles can be attributed to the Revolution, then it  follows  that
to  save  the  nation,  the   Revolution   and   its   mythology   in   the   present   must   be
destroyed.’[11] From the last years of  the  nineteenth  century  to  the  first  years  of  the
twenty-first, this has been a fact of life.
But, what of the extreme right? What does it stand  for?  Billig  outlines  the  scale  of  the
problem:
The term ’extreme right’ is a particularly troubling one to use in political  analysis.  In
ordinary speech and in journalistic writing  one  could  use  the  term  without  being
misunderstood,  and  intuitively  there  seems  to   be   a   set   of   political   parties,
movements and tendencies  which  ’go  together’,  for  example  all  outwardly  Nazi
parties. However, in an academic context this is not  sufficient:  one  would  have  to
justify why such parties are being called both extreme and right-wing. And it is  here
that the problems start.[12]
Needless to say, it is the aim of the present study to make sense  of  these  ’problems’  in
the French context. Hainsworth refers to the same issue:
The concept of the right…is elusive and, by  extension,  so  is  that  of  the  extreme
right. Of course,  it  would  be  wonderfully  convenient  -  though  acadamic  wishful
thinking - if leaders, parties and movements  labelled  themselves  extreme  right  to
make easier the task of comparison and analysis. Instead, organisations  studiously
avoid and reject extreme right labelling.[13]
Thus, we are left in a difficult situation. We want to attach labels to  ’leaders,  parties  and
movements’, and also political traditions, in a relative and comparative way,  but  there  is
always the danger of being simplistic, subjective and even pejorative.
      Anderson suggests that moderates on the right probably have more in  common  with
moderates on the left than they do with extremists on the right and  seems  to  imply  that
the gap between ’right’ and ’extreme right’ is greater than we think.[14]  This is interesting
but it should not bother us unduly. We are more interested in the nature of the far right  in
France  rather  than  its  proximity  to  other  traditions,  but   here   we   encounter   more
problems. Is there one extreme right or several? De  Maistre,  the  émigrés,  the  Vendée
rebels, the  Ultras,  Charles  X,  Boulanger,  Barrès,  the  Ligue  des  Patriotes,  the  Anti-
Dreyfusard Movement, the Action Française, the fascist  ligues,  Vichy,  the  Paris  Nazis,
Algérie Française, Poujadism, the FN. All these individuals  and  movements  have,  to  a
greater or lesser extent, been saddled with  the  label  ’extreme  right’  over  the  last  200
years. Do they really have anything in common? And if so, what?
      On balance Hainsworth says the extreme right  in  France  is  almost  indefinable,[15]
and given this fact we must take Winock’s advice and not get too hung up on the  precise
definition of the term. He accepts the  term  is  problematic  but  says  it  is  still  ’used  by
everybody’, and as such is an aid to understanding.[16]  Another  difficulty  comes  in  the
fact that the far right in  France  is  consistently  stigmatised  and  demonised  by  political
opponents, historians and social  scientists.  It  is  as  if  ’extreme’  political  traditions  are
devoid  of  ideas  and  theory,  and  exist  only  as  battering-rams  for   politically   correct
observers. This kind of polemic is unhelpful and certainly does not assist our quest  for  a
working definition.[17] McClelland counters this negativity and  refers  to  ’the  intellectual
respectability of extreme right-wing thought in France.’[18] This is a significant  statement
to make and gives our study a clear rationale.
      Historians such as Sirinelli and Winock have explored  the  extreme  right  tradition  in
full.[19] There are no easy answers as to what is of the extreme  right,  and  what  is  not,
but it is clear that the far right possesses many characteristics of the right, but to  a  more
intense  and  radical  degree.  On  the  far  right  there  is  also  an  intransigence  and   a
willingness to resort to extra-parliamentary tactics that is not a feature of the conventional
right.
      It  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  construct  an  ‘identikit’  extreme  right.  In  every
generation the far right seems to re-emerge, often in a new and totally different guise, but
a   helpful   starting-point   is   Winock’s   assertion   that,   whatever   the   overlaps   and
complexities,  there  have  been  continuities  on  the  extreme  right  over   the   last   two
centuries.  He  alludes  to  five:  the  rejection  of  parliament,  the  attachment  to   strong
government,  the  hatred  of  socialism  and  communism,  the  belief  in  the   closure   of
frontiers, and a  consistent  desire  to  ’rebuild  la  maison  française’.[20]  We  might  add
others as well: the ability to exploit crisis conditions, the belief in direct action, the  use  of
violence  (sometimes),  a  constant  trust  in  ‘charismatic’  cult  leaders,  a   tendency   to
communicate in both populist and intellectual terms (occasionally at the same time)  and,
more often than not, failure. Billig seeks to distinguish the extreme right from the extreme
left, the  non-extreme  right  and  fascism.  However,  he  acknowledges  a  clear  overlap
between the  ’extreme  right’  and  ’fascism’  and  distinguishes  three  common  features:
nationalism/racism, anti-Marxism/communism, and a hostility to democracy.[21]
      Anderson, talking about the  1880-1970  period  also  moves  towards  some  kind  of
general characterisation:
The extreme Right has had its own themes expressed continuously but with varying
degrees of vociferousness since the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century.  These  have
related   mainly   to   various   conspiratorial   views   of   politics    including    Jews,
Freemasons, foreigners, bankers and the ’two hundred families’. Anti-Etatisme  has
been a  common  platform,  at  various  times,  of  groups  threatened  by  economic
change and the fiscal policy of the  State.  But  all  the  continuities  are  vague  and
tenuous. The content of the common attitudes or traditions has  been  so  ill-defined
and so much disputed that they have not provided  symbols  around  which  durable
political organisations could be built.[22]
On the basis of such views, it is possible  to  argue  that  there  is  a  single  extreme-right
tradition in France - in effect, a linear progression, through a  variety  of  movements  and
ideas, from 1789 to the present day. Winock  agrees  with  this  general  line  of  thinking,
arguing  that  even  though  the  extreme-right  tradition  is  a  ’kaleidoscope’,   there   are
important elements of continuity.[23]  He says that in each generation  the  extreme  right
has a newness about it, but also an element of heritage.[24]
      Today’s FN is a good example of a far-right movement that is both ’new’  and  ’old’.  It
has developed distinctive positions on modern issues such as  Europe  and  immigration,
embraced twenty-first  century  technology  in  the  shape  of  the  Internet,  and  adapted
seamlessly to the world of 24-hour news. The ultimate in mediatique  politicians,  Le  Pen
is in many ways the personification of modernity. That said,  it  is  also  true  that  the  FN
situates itself in line with tradition. Whether knowingly or unknowingly  -  and  for  most  of
the time it is the former - the movement still honours  the  memory  of  Algérie  Française,
still makes use of Poujadist vocabulary,  still  emphasises  Vichyite  themes,  still  talks  a
rabble-rousing language reminscent of the inter-war ligues, still imitates  the  populism  of
Boulanger, still apes the ’rooted’ nationalism of Barrès, and still associates itself with anti-
revolutionary and  counter-revolutionary  politics.  The  same  could  be  said  of  Pétain’s
wartime regime and the radical right of the late nineteenth century, for  they  too  adapted
themselves to a new political context and defined themselves in modern terms but at  the
same time were not frightened of drawing on elements of the  past  to  help  expand  their
appeal.
Historians and the French right 
In Europe and America Eatwell and O’Sullivan identify five ‘types’  of  right:  ‘reactionary’,
‘radical’, ‘moderate’, ‘extreme’ and ‘new’,  and  this  typology  will  be  a  useful  reference
point for the duration of the study.[25] Eatwell says it is ’difficult to find a  common  linking
strand   in   right-wing   thought’   because    there    are    ’significant    differences’    and
’contradictions’ across the spectrum.[26] Again, this point is worth bearing in mind as  our
examination of the French right-wing tradition progresses.
      In his classic study, Rémond pinpoints three ’families’ within the main tradition  of  the
French  right:   Orleanism,   nationalism/Bonapartism   and   Ultracism.[27]   Interestingly,
though, he rarely talks explicitly about ’extremism’; nor does he  give  much  credibility  to
the notion of a  French  fascist  tradition.[28]  Sternhell,  Milza  and  Soucy  disagree  with
Rémond because they do identify a fascist tradition. Sternhell  says  that  France  offered
’particularly favourable conditions’ for the growth of fascism (as movement and  ideology,
rather than regime).[29] He views French fascism as a cocktail of nationalist and socialist
elements and in the  period  1880-1920  discerns  the  birth  of  ’a  mass  movement’  (’un
mouvement de masse’) - in effect, a new ’revolutionary right’;[30] Soucy locates a  fascist
tradition that in its early phase owed a significant debt to Barrès and by the middle of  the
twentieth century had given birth to a ’definite ideology’ and was ’highly moralistic,  highly
serious-minded’.[31] Milza, meanwhile,  traces  the  history  of  French  fascism  from  the
1880s to the 1980s.[32]
      Arnold’s edited volume highlights the diversity of the ’radical right’. This political
family is depicted as broad-ranging and home to anti-semitic, fascist, collaborationist,
neo-Nazi,  new-rightist  and  extreme-right  currents.[33]  For  his  part,  Sirinelli  refers  to
Ultracisme, and then Legitimism, as the ’true right’. He argues that a new right  was  born
in the  late  nineteenth  century  and,  in  this  regard,  talks  about  ’the  dawn  of  political
modernity’.[34] During the last century he  identifies  both  a  parliamentary  and  an  anti-
parliamentary right; in the post-1945 period he refers continually to ’les droites’, and  after
1965 he pinpoints an ’extreme right’ and also a ’new  right’.[35]  Anderson  examines  the
political and intellectual history of France after 1880  and  locates  conservative,  counter-
revolutionary and nationalist strands to the broad tradition.[36] He attempts to sum up the
essence of the right:
A simple prejudice has been  widely  shared  among  French  politicians,  since  the
failure  to  restore  the  monarchy  in  the  1870s,  that  to  be  of  the  Right   implies
association with the forces of the past…Groups accrete to the Right  as  a  result  of
changing circumstances. No issue or  theme  defines  the  Right  for  any  extended
period of time but there nevertheless have been threads running through the politics
of the Right since the late nineteenth  century.  These  are  clericalism,  nationalism,
regionalism and the defence of property.[37]
In his 1994 study Winock identifies two main sub-traditions: counter-revolution (’over  two
centuries  it  has  kept  its  vigour  and  its  unity  of  thought’)[38]  and  populism/national-
populism  (’the  goal  is  not  to  restore   the   monarchy   but   to   found   a   firm-handed
regime’).[39] He is also happy  to  countenance  a  third  tradition  –  fascism  –  from  the
1920s onwards.[40] The title of his 1990 book - Nationalisme, Antisémitisme et Fascisme
en France - would suggest that he also conceives  of  an  independent  and  autonomous
anti-semitic  tradition.[41]  Austin’s  exclusive  focus   is   the   inter-war   period   and   he
recognises a powerful far right and conservative right. He concludes that  the  ’ideological
differences’ between these two factions was ’often buried, especially between  1934  and
1938 when conservatives and extremists shared a common  commitment  to  recapturing
political power.’[42] This example helps us  to  understand  the  way  in  which  right-wing
traditions can fuse.
Petitfils  talks  about  the  extreme-right  tradition  as  a  combination  of  ’le   nationalisme
français’ and ’la tentation fasciste’, but underpinned by ’the old traditionalist and  counter-
revolutionary current’.[43] He argues that these three traditions are very different and that
over time far-right activists have had their fall-outs but, he says, what is undeniable is the
’permanence and renewal of ideological themes’ and ’the multiple points of  convergence
that go to form the unity of this political  family.’[44]  The  dichotomy  at  the  heart  of  the
extreme-right tradition is clear. There may be many different phases but  there  is  also  a
’tradition of thought unbroken since the Revolution’.[45]
      Although historians are divided on how  to  break  down  and  classify  the  right,  it  is
possible to synthesise their ideas, and it is clear that we should  talk  in  the  plural  rather
than the singular. And as  we  will  discover,  some  right-wing  traditions  are  particularly
relevant to a study of the extreme right, while others are less so.[46]
Right-wing ’families’
The counter-revolutionary right
The counter-revolutionary - or reactionary[47] - tradition is the most enduring on the  right
and, at the same time, is crucial in helping us to understand the essence of  the  extreme
right. As we noted earlier, McClelland argues that the most important characteristic of the
right in general, and thus of the extreme right, is its hostility to the French Revolution and,
more specifically, the  values  that  emerged  out  of  1789.[48]  On  an  intellectual  level,
Joseph de Maistre fired the first shots:
There is a satanic element in the French Revolution which distinguishes it from  any
other  revolution  known  or  perhaps  that  will  be  known.   Remember   the   great
occasions - Robespierre’s speech against the priesthood,  the  solemn  apostasy  of
the priests, the desecration of objects of worship, the inauguration of the goddess of
Reason, and the many outrageous acts  by  which  the  provinces  tried  to  surpass
Paris: these  all  leave  the  ordinary  sphere  of  crimes  and  seem  to  belong  to  a
different world.[49]
It is because of passages like this that de Maistre is commonly  viewed  as  the  founding
father not only of the  counter-revolutionary  right,  but  of  the  right  and  the  far  right  in
France. O’Sullivan describes him as the personification of ’reactionary conservatism’.[50]
      In  terms  of  action,  the  main  players  were  the  Vendée  rebels,  the  emigrés  and
members  of  the  Court  (primarily,  the  King  and  Queen)  -  actors  who   exhibited   an
’excessive sentimentality’.[51] It is a mistake, however, to associate counter-revolutionary
values with the decade 1789-99 alone, for Counter-Revolution is  an  idea  rather  than  a
period of time. In the early nineteenth century the torch was passed on to the  Ultras  (the
’pure’ émigrés of  the  1790s)  and  they  put  their  faith  in  a  ’mystic  conception  of  the
monarchy’.[52] Extreme royalism reinvented itself as ’Legitimism’ following  the  anti-Ultra
revolution of 1830, and it was to trade under this name right up until its demise in the  last
quarter of the nineteenth century. Ultracisme is examined in depth in Chapter  2,  but  the
impact of this political force can be seen  throughout  the  book,  and  throughout  French
history.
      Extreme-right movements in the twentieth century also exhibited  a  strong  dislike  of
the  Revolution:  from  the  pro-restoration  Action  Française  through  to  Vichy  -   which
banned the 1789 Déclaration and replaced the revolutionary triptych  of  ’Liberté,  Egalité,
Fraternité’ with ’Travail, Famille, Patrie’ – and the FN, which in 1989 campaigned  against
the idea of ‘celebrating’ the 200th  Anniversary  of  the  event.[53]  McClelland  says  that,
’what unites the right ideologically in France is the fundamental attack on reason and  the
rights of man.’[54]
      Out of this basic position – an in-bred mistrust of the Revolution and all it stands for –
have emerged other related standpoints; most obviously, a critique of the  left.  Those  on
the far right have viewed nineteenth- and twentieth-century socialists and communists as
the chief benefactors of the Revolution’s inheritance and as such  they  have  demonised
ideas and movements of the left. This has been consistent and in different  eras  different
organisations   have   suffered:   the    Jacobins    in    the    1790s,    the    Liberals    and
Constitutionalists  during  the  Restoration,  Dreyfusards  in  the  1890s,  the   Cartel   des
Gauches and the Popular Front  in  the  inter-war  period,  Resistance  forces  during  the
Second World War, and the PS and PCF in the contemporary period. At the height of the
Cold War, Le Pen explained his antipathy towards the left:
Today the USSR and communism constitute the main threat to our liberties and our
lives….Communism is an economic system of stupidity and imbecility and  this  has
been demonstrated to good effect  by  the  material  results  of  almost  70  years  of
slavery and brutality.[55]
Others have couched their anti-leftism in more sophisticated terms, but the message  has
invariably  been  similar.  Hainsworth  recognises  that  anti-communism  is  not  the  sole
preserve of the extreme right, but in his view it still remains ’a longstanding attribute’.[56]
      In  addition  to  anti-leftist  political  warfare,  movements  of  the  far  right  have  also
engaged in attacks on basic concepts like democracy.  Vichy  banned  elections  and  the
ligues of the inter-war years yearned for the complete overhaul of the democratic system.
Some individuals on the far right have engaged with  the  democratic  process  -  Le  Pen
since the 1970s, Poujade in  the  1950s  and  Boulanger  and  Barrès  in  the  1880s  and
1890s – but their main instinct has always been to oppose  it  and  campaign  instead  for
some kind of utopian alternative.  Barrès  is  a  good  case  in  point.  Campaigning  as  a
Boulangist in 1898, he demanded: ’Revision of  the  Constitution  with  the  aim  of  giving
universal  suffrage  its  full  and  complete  sovereignty,  particularly   by   means   of   the
municipal referendum.’[57] The intention here is noble, but the language is vague.
      The far right’s hatred of the Revolution resurfaces  in  its  virulent  anti-republicanism.
Just as today the FN  offers  an  in-depth  critique  of  the  Fifth  Republic  –  and  actually
proposes the establishment of a  ‘Sixth  Republic’[58]  –  so  the  Poujadists  and  Algérie
Française activists of the 1950s campaigned against the Fourth Republic on  account  of:
(a)  its  ’insensitivity’  to  small  businesses;  and  (b)  its  weakness  in  the  face  of  Arab
nationalists. Likewise, the Third Republic was dogged from birth by protest  and  agitation
on the radical right. The Ligue des Patriotes condemned the regime’s  lack  of  interest  in
claiming back the ’lost territories’ of Alsace and Lorraine,  while  Boulanger  criticised  the
corruption and selfishness of parliamentary  députés  and  Barrès  condemned  the  ’anti-
national’  policies  of  successive  governments.   The   Anti-Dreyfusards   of   the   1890s
synthesised these ideas and were close to bringing the regime to  its  knees.  Their  coup
d’état failed, but their assault on the hated Republic was a milestone and left a significant
legacy.
      Nonetheless, it was probably Maurras who  crafted  the  most  compelling  critique  of
republicanism. In 1899 the  AF  leader  contrasted  the  Third  Republic  with  the  royalist
regime he yearned for:
The ridiculous republic, one and indivisible, that we know so well, will no  longer  be
the prey of ten thousand invisible, uncontrollable little tyrants; instead  thousands  of
little republics of every sort, ’domestic’ republics  like  families,  ’local’  republics  like
towns and provinces. ’intellectual’ and ’professional’ republics like associations,  will
freely adminsiter their own affairs, guaranteed, coordinated and directed as a whole
by one sole power which is permanent, that is to say  personal  and  hereditary  and
with an interest in the  preservation  and  development  of  the  state…Whereas  the
citizen of the French Republic is left only with his own meagre individual  powers  to
protect him against the mighty state machine,  the  citizen  of  the  new  kingdom  of
France will find  himself  a  member  of  all  kinds  of  strong  and  free  communities
(family,  town,  province,  professional  organisation  etc.)  which  will   deploy   their
strength to protect him from any injustice.[59]
The ligues of the 1920s and ‘30s shared Maurras’ dislike of the Republic, but  argued  for
some kind of firm executive government rather than the return of the kings.
      Pétain and his acolytes blamed the pre-1940 regime for the Fall of France  and  in  so
doing absolved the military. They talked about the ‘decadence’ of the Third Republic  and
one pro-Vichy writer spoke of ’this hovel we have lived in  for  70  years.’[60]  For  Petain,
the Republic was the Revolution by proxy, and it is  no  surprise  that  Vichy  propaganda
played so heavily on the weakness and fragility of the pre-1940 regime  and  the  intrinsic
stability and strength of the post-1940 regime – or so things were perceived.[61]
      At certain junctures, the corollary of this  critique  has  been  a  call  for  ’Conservative
Revolution’.[62] The AF patented this slogan but Pétain and others also took it on  board.
The belief was that France, somehow, had to go backwards to go forwards.  However,  in
saying this, we should note the fact that since 1880 many groups on the  far-right  fringes
of French politics have viewed themselves not as conservatives and reactionaries, but as
radicals. At one point or another, Boulanger  and  Le  Pen  have  defined  themselves  as
’revolutionaries’,  and   have   even   placed   themselves   explicitly   within   the   French
revolutionary tradition.[63]
      As a footnote to this discussion, it should be said that  extreme  nostalgia  sometimes
substitutes itself for counter-revolutionary zeal. In the  1950s  Poujade  looked  on  small-
town, pre-supermarket France as a ’golden age’ and  in  the  same  decade  the  hardline
Algerian rebels displayed a powerful attachment to France’s imperial past.
But in general terms it is accurate to characterise the far-right tradition as, first and
foremost, counter-revolutionary. McClelland claims that, ’if, as the right has argued, all
France’s troubles can be attributed to the Revolution, then it follows that to save the
nation, the Revolution and its mythology in the present must be destroyed.’[64]
Nationalism and national-populism
The national-populist tradition  is  younger  than  the  counter-revolutionary  tradition,  but
equally as imposing. Nationalism is not exclusive to the extreme right - on the  contrary  -
but it is nevertheless a core element of its heritage.
      It  is  tempting  to  argue  that,  since  1880,  nationalism  has  been  an  ever-present
characteristic of the far right. Anderson writes:
The beautifully expressed  and  eclectic  nationalist  sentiments  of  Maurice  Barrès
have been very widely held. Many of  his  ideas  were  typical  of  a  European  wide
intellectual  climate  of  the  1890s.  The  sense  of  decadence,  hostility   to   liberal
democracy and  big  city  civilisation,  and  condemnation  of  corrupt  and  unheroic
modern  society  were  attitudes…(that)  reached  their   apotheosis   in   the   Vichy
regime.[65]
Winock goes further and argues that ’two hundred  years  of  uninterrupted  "decadence"’
has had profound consequences for la nation française.[66]
      Indeed, since  the  late  nineteenth  century,  those  on  the  far  right  have  generally
championed a bi-polar conception  of  the  world.  There  is  ’France’  and  there  is  ’Anti-
France’. ’France pour les Français’ nationalists have aligned themselves with some or  all
of the following: ’language’, ’le peuple’, ’culture’, ’roots’,  ’le  tricolore’,  ’religion’,  ’soil’,  ’la
terre’, ’blood’,  ’Joan  of  Arc’,  ’enracinement’,  ’the  military’,  ’eternal  values’,  ’les  petits
gens’, ’agriculture’, ’Empire’, ’le chef de l’état’, ’ancestry’, ’the regions’. At the same  time,
they   have   attacked   all   evidence   of   ’Anti-France’,    whether    ’Jews’,    ’socialists’,
’immigrants’,   ’cosmopolitans’,   ’foreigners’,   ’internationalists’,   ’gypsies’,    ’metèques’,
’revolutionaries’, ’freemasons’, ’Germans’, ’philosophes’, ’Arabs’,  ’half-castes’,  ’disease’,
’mosques’,     ’foulards’,     ’the     French     Revolution’,     ’protestants’,     ’AIDS’.     This
conceptualisation is graphic but at the same time simplistic and reveals  much  about  the
black-and- white mentality of the extreme right.
      According to  Winock  and  Hainsworth,  the  national-populist  tradition  encapsulates
movements of the late nineteenth century and the  late  twentieth  century  (and  many  in
between).[67] With the advent of the Third Republic and  mass  politics  in  the  1870s,  a
new type of right emerged - modern, radical  and  embodied  by  the  new  icons:  Barrès,
Boulanger  and  Déroulède.[68]  It  sought  to  adapt  itself  to  the  circumstances  of  the
moment and to  engage  with  democratic  politics.  Winock  talks  about  the  ’era  of  the
masses’: when ’the people’ were viewed as the source of all authority and legitimacy and
when anti-semitism emerged as a new defining  characteristic  of  the  far  right.[69]  This
new radical right was populist and nationalist, and in line with Woods’ typology  it  viewed
the ’existing social order (as) decadent’ and in need of removal.[70] It is possible, without
too much trouble, to view three twentieth-century phenomena - the  ligues,  the  Poujadist
movement and  the  FN  -  as  part  of  the  same  family.  The  language  used  by  these
groupings is significant. In the 1980s an FN propaganda poster stated  simply:  ’LE  PEN,
LE PEUPLE’.
      National-populism, in the view of Winock, is the product of  three  core  attitudes:  ’we
are in decadence’; ’the guilty are known’; ’the Saviour has arrived’.[71] And Hainsworth is
happy to lump together national-populists from different generations:
The political rationale of Barrès, Boulanger, Paul  Déroulède’s  Ligue  des  Patriotes
and Le Pen  is  premissed  upon  the  perceived  decadence  and  moral  decline  of
France, attributable to political mismanagement and retreat from  traditional  values.
Furthermore, Barrès evoked the will of a great country to  rediscover  its  destiny,  a
theme echoed by Le Pen in his major speeches and writings.[72]
Today, the FN is the embodiment of a virulent brand of closed nationalism and it is strong
in its patriotism and vitriolic in its  hatreds:  North  African  immigration,  ‘Americanisation’
and the ‘Brussels-dominated’ EC among others.[73]
      In the 1950s Poujadism was both anti-immigrant  and  pro-empire,  while  the  Algérie
Française movement was completely loyal to the idea of France as a  pro-active  imperial
power.[74] In the 1940s  Vichy  stood  as  the  embodiment  of  ultra-nostalgic  patriotism.
Although it was fatally compromised  by  its  collaboration  with  Nazi  Germany,  Pétain’s
regime put great emphasis on  ‘eternal’  French  values.  The  Marshal  –  France’s  most
famous soldier and ‘Victor of Verdun’ - was the ultimate role-model.
      In many ways the backward-looking National Revolution launched by  Vichy  was  the
natural sequel to  the  integral  nationalism  of  Barrès  and  Maurras.  These  two  writers
developed a way of thinking about France that was to influence many, not just  Pétain.  In
the latter years of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth  century,
they argued that France  had  to  withstand  all  external  pressures  and  ‘threats’  (which
Maurras grouped together under the  epithet  ‘Anti-France’).  They  viewed  patriotism  as
‘unconditional’ and put great store on the preservation of the  ‘moi  national’,  even  if  this
meant erecting ‘barriers’ (more metaphorical than real). Neither Barrès nor  Maurras  had
any truck with the notion of a ‘cosmopolitan’ France and yearned instead for  an  integral,
homogenous nation, entirely free of ‘alien’ influences.
      Although Revisionist[75] politicians like Boulanger  and  Barrès  resorted  to  socialist-
sounding platitudes  when  appropriate  (when  they  needed  working-class  votes),  their
obsessive nationalism – and, at times, racism – placed them  firmly  on  the  far  right.  As
such, in the decades after 1880 ‘patriotism’ became intrinsically associated with  the  new
radical right. This was a significant change for before 1880 the left had claimed to be  the
‘patriotic’ party and the monarchical right had given  them  plenty  of  ammunition.  During
the Revolution the princes and aristocrats had shown themselves to be  more  concerned
with cross-monarchical solidarity than the future of the nation, and in 1871 it was  the  left
that wanted to carry on the war and the right that wanted to retreat. So, in this sense,  the
1880s were a landmark. Nationalism was now associated with the far  right  and  what  is
more it became a defining characteristic, but only after 1880.
Having said that, a couple of important qualifications need to be made: the inter-war
ligues were pro-German in outlook, and the policy of collaboration pursued by the Vichy
regime was obviously a very unnatural agenda for a ‘patriotic’ regime.
      We could also  suggest  that  blame-allocation  is  a  longstanding  feature  of  the  far
right.[76] Hainsworth says that,  ’nourished  by  defeatism  and  anxious  for  redress,  the
extreme right has found little  difficulty  in  pinpointing  scapegoats  for  France’s  failures:
Jews, Freemasons,  foreigners,  communists  and  other  allegedly  alien  influences.’[77]
This kind of mentality is a continuum. Barrès’ view that foreign  workers  were  ‘parasites’
(espoused in the late-1880s)[78] finds an echo in Le Pen’s belief that France  is  suffering
an ‘invasion’ of North African immigrants (expounded throughout the 1980s, 1990s and in
the first years of the twenty-first century). There have been other  graphic  illustrations  of
nationalism veering off into xenophobia: the insularity of the AF and  Vichy,  the  ideology
of ‘superiority’ advanced by the ligues, and the anti-Arab discourse  of  Poujade  and  the
pieds noirs in the 1950s.
       Likewise,  anti-semitism:  a  key  ingredient  in   national-populist   ideology   but   not
exclusive to it, and not so much a characteristic as a  tradition  or,  in  Winock’s  words,  a
’current’.[79] Byrnes explains how Drumont - arguably the most  notorious  anti-semite  in
French history - was able to connect with people in the 1880s:
(He) brought into  his  antisemitic  books  both  the  racy,  journalistic  style  and  the
eagerness to bluster and offend which had been characteristic of some of his earlier
writings…Drumont’s volumes were not only skilfully written, but they were an expert
blend of true and false.  He  scattered  attractive  anecdotes  throughout  his  works,
giving them an interesting concrete and personal element…Provincial readers were
attracted by his intimate descriptions of Paris  society  at  its  worst,  while  romantic
souls enjoyed his musical treatment of mediaeval France and of the beauties of  the
countryside…La  France  juive  not  only  became  the  most  widely  read  book   in
France, but it also prepared the way for a whole series of books by Drumont on  the
same theme.[80]
In many ways Drumont viewed anti-semitism as  an  ideal  way  of  tapping  into  people’s
preoccupations and, thus,  a  means  towards  the  ultimate  end  of  making  a  name  for
himself. This helps us to understand the essence of national-populism.
      Sternhell emphasises the importance of anti-semitism in the late  nineteenth  century,
arguing that it was instrumental  in  the  emergence  of  a  ’new  intellectual  climate’  and
eventually paved the way for  fascism.[81]  From  Drumont  and  the  radical  right  of  the
1880s and 1890s through to the Maurras, the ligues  and  Pétain,  Jew-baiting  has  been
ever-present. Even in the post-war period  when  the  extreme-right  should  have  known
better, the anti-semitic dimension to Poujadist and FN rhetoric has been  there  for  all  to
see, and it is for this reason that Wistrich entitles  his  chapter  on  French  anti-semitism,
’From Dreyfus to Le Pen’.[82]
      The trap we should not fall into  is  to  view  all  these  instances  of  anti-semitism  as
identical. The fact of the matter is that over 120 years several  main  ’types’  are  evident.
We should not put too much store on the labels, nor should we assume that the  ‘families’
are mutually exclusive, but it is possible nevertheless to identify a  ‘cynical’  anti-semitism
(as advanced by the Anti-Dreyfusards and Laval), a  ‘xenophobic’  anti-semitism  (Barrès,
Maurras), a ‘sensationalist’ anti-semitism (Drumont, Le Pen) and  an  ‘opportunistic’  anti-
semitism (Boulanger, Poujade). Overall, Wistrich confirms that ’the  ideological  continuity
in French antisemitism has shown remarkable persistence.’[83]
We should note finally that it is not just in France that traditions of  national-populism  and
extreme right politics overlap. Hainsworth talks in global terms:
Central to the extreme right’s discourse is the question of  identity,  national  identity
drawing upon language, religion, culture, history and other aspects. Nation, national
identity, ethnocentrism: these are at the core of the  extreme  right’s  value  system.
The rhetoric of the extreme right is  based  upon  a  vision  of  the  nation  supreme,
heroic, pure and unsullied by  alien  forces  such  as  Third  World  immigration  and
communist  ideology…National-populism,  although  not  simply  a  preserve  of  the
extreme right, helps largely to differentiate the extreme right from  the  moderate  or
traditional right, with the former often able to attract a significant number of  voters  -
working-class, ex-left wing,  unemployed,  disaffected  youth,  former  abstentionists
and first-time voters - temporarily (or otherwise) denied to the latter.[84]
It would also be true to say that many assumptions associated with  the  national-populist
tradition are replicated on the fascist right.
Fascism
Fascism, without doubt, is the most controversial political phenomenon in France.  In  the
words of Winock: ’Fascisme à la française ou fascisme introuvable?’ (’French fascism  or
fascism nowhere to be seen?’)
      Rémond is notoriously sceptical  about  the  existence  of  fascist  movements,  never
mind a fascist  tradition,[85]  but  other  historians  are  willing  to  countenance  the  idea.
Eatwell  argues  that  French  fascism  was  more  an  intellectual  phenomenon   than   a
practical political proposition and also identifies a buoyant neo-fascist tradition  in  France
in the decades after 1945.[86] Sternhell  and  Soucy  are  committed  to  the  notion  of  a
French fascism. The former is particularly  interested  in  the  period  between  1880  and
1914,  in  which  he  detects  the  emergence  of   a   ’pre-fascism’   that   anticipates   the
emergence of ’full-blown’ fascism in the 1920s and 1930s. His two main  theses  are  that
twentieth-century French fascism was an indigenous phenomenon  and  that,  in  its  ’full-
blown’ state, it synthesised leftist and rightist assumptions. Soucy’s research ties  in  with
much of this, but he puts particular stress on the political ideas of Barrès, ’the first French
fascist’.[87]
      For his part, Milza identifies a rich,  varied  and  perplexing  orbit  of  movements  and
ideas. Writing in 1987, he talks about  fascism  in  the  past  and  the  present  tense  and
characterises   the   contemporary   species   as   a   product   of   post-Vichy   ’fantasies,
obsessions and hatreds’.[88] His main conclusion is that  fascism  has  been  remarkably
unsuccessful, due mainly to its lack of numbers  and  the  formidable  ’republican  culture’
that  exists  in  France.[89]  Winock  concurs  on  this  last  point  -  he   talks   about   the
’republican spirit’ and the ’reflex of "republican defence" in the face of  the  far  right[90]  -
but he delineates a fascist tradition in France beginning only in the 1920s.
      Nolte’s contibution the debate is important. He  recognises  the  Action  Française  as
one of the ’three faces’ of inter-war European fascism, and remarks:
In spite of all its doctrinal  rigidity,  the  system  of  Maurras’  ideas  is  of  an  extent,
acuteness, and depth without parallel  in  the  Germany  or  Italy  of  that  time.  The
practice  of  the  Action   Française   anticipates,   in   the   clear   simplicity   of   the
rudimentary, the characteristic  traits  of  the  infinitely  cruder  and  more  wholesale
methods used in Italy and Germany. Seen by itself, the Action Française  is  not  an
epochal phenomenon. Yet it is, as it were, the  missing  link  demonstrating  fascism
as a stage in an overall and much older struggle.[91]
This comment helps to put French fascism in a European context and, at the same  time,
demonstrates the significance of ’early fascism’.
      So, from ’early fascism’ and ’pre-fascism’ - when the idea of fascism  existed  but  the
word  itself  did  not[92]  -  through  to  ’semi-fascism’  and  ’neo-fascism’,  France   is   an
important field of study and whatever  the  caveats  and  qualifications  there  is  a  strong
case to  be  made  for  the  existence  of  an  independent,  autonomous  fascist  tradition
running through her intellectual history.
Warner says that, ’only a major catastrophe could bring fascism to power in France’,[93]
and pinpoints 1940 as the moment. However, fascisme français was never a reality in the
same sense that Italian or German fascism was but, ironically, this has tended to
increase historians’ fascination in the subject, rather than lessen it. Griffin states:
France provides a major case study in the often subtle  distinctions  which  separate
fascism from new forms of radical right that emerged after  1870  such  as  the  anti-
Semitic leagues, prototypes of national  socialism  associated  with  Boulanger  and
Barrès, the mainstream Action Française or the veteran anti-socialist  leagues  such
as the Croix de Feu, which were such a feature of inter-war France.[94]
More rights
The Bonapartist tradition will be of interest to us in the present study, but most  historians
would agree that as political leaders Napoleon I  and  Napoleon  III  were  devoid  of  real
political ideology and were interested mainly in power and jingoism, not ideology, and  as
such could not seriously be considered as being of  the  ’right’  or  ’extreme  right’  in  any
meaningful  sense.  However,  as  Winock  notes,  Bonapartism  did  have   a   significant
influence on individuals such as Boulanger and Déroulède and movements such as  anti-
Dreyfusardism and the inter-war ligues.  In  more  specific  terms,  he  identifies  a  strong
plebiscitary, anti-parliamentary continuum.[95] Rémond thinks in  the  same  kind  of  way
and in Boulangist agitation, he locates a Bonapartist-style nationalism.[96]
      The Gaullist right was born with General de Gaulle and outlived him. The significance
of Gaullism has to be  understood,  but  no-one  could  argue  that  it  was  (or  is)  ’of  the
extreme-right’. Indeed, in many senses, it was (and is) unusually hostile  to  the  far  right.
Not many Algérie Française veterans would  agree  that  the  Gaullist  Party  is  (to  quote
Anderson)  ’the  long-awaited  culmination’  of  right-wing  politics![97]  There   are   some
significant  overlaps  between  Gaullist  right   and   extreme   right   (for   example:   ‘cult’
authoritarian leadership, nationalism, and an intense belief  in  the  grandeur  of  France),
but we must keep things in perspective.
      In the modern era - the 1980s and 1990s in particular - we  should  acknowledge  the
emergence of a new right tradition. On a global scale Eatwell interprets the New Right as
an amalgam of libertarian, laissez-faire, traditionalist and mythical  thinking,  underpinned
by a powerful anti-communism.[98] In France La Nouvelle Droite is difficult  to  pin  down,
but in de Benoist, GRECE and the  Club  d’Horloge,  France  has  given  birth  to  a  new,
distinct and progressive type of right that, over the years,  has  impacted  significantly  on
Le Pen’s FN.[99]
      The liberal right -  heir  to  Rémond’s  Orleanist  right  -  is  a  significant  continuity  in
French history, but it is of only limited relevance to a study  of  far-right  politics.  If  it  has
importance  it  is  in  the  sense  that  it   contrasts   so   sharply   with   the   extreme-right
tradition.[100] This is not an  exhaustive  survey  -  far  from  it  -  but  it  does  help  us  to
understand the main traditions that have underpinned right-wing discourse  over  the  last
200 years.
Given the parameters of this study,  it  would  be  fair  to  say  that,  of  the  sub-traditions
referred  to  so  far,  Counter-Revolution  (incorporating  Ultracism),  nationalism/national-
populism, fascism, nationalism/Bonapartism and the new right are of most relevance.  By
contrast, Gaullism and the liberal/Orleanist right are of  only  marginal  importance  to  us.
The parameters of this particular study dictate that we leave these two  sub-traditions  on
one side. As  we  will  discover,  the  counter-revolutionary,  national-populist  and  fascist
traditions are omnipresent on the far right, and we will now focus on these three ’families’
almost exclusively.
      A plethora of questions are raised with regard to these central traditions: Which is the
most  dominant?  At  what  point  does  each  sub-tradition  reach  its  apogée?  In  which
individual or movement does each sub-tradition find its best, most  graphic  embodiment?
Which individuals or movements crystallise, in themselves, all  three  sub-traditions?  Are
all three sub-traditions alive today? In this chapter, and in the book  as  a  whole,  we  will
touch on all these issues.
      It should be reiterated that the nature of these traditions is certainly not cut and dried.
On the subject of nationalism, for  example,  Winock  talks  about  an  ’open  nationalism’
(associated with the left) and a ’closed nationalism’ (associated with the  right),  and  also
speaks  of  ’variations  and  contradictions’  within  the  French  nationalist   tradition.[101]
Similarly, with regard to fascism, Sternhell talks about a ’heterogeneous’ and ’ambiguous’
phenomenon.[102] These remarks should serve as a warning to us  as  our  investigation
proceeds and becomes more detailed.
      We should not assume either that these main sub-traditions  are  mutually  exclusive.
Quite the contrary in fact, for there are junctures at which all three do appear to intersect:
most notably, in Barrès (anti-Dreyfusard, arch-nationalist and, arguably, ‘the  first  French
fascist’),[103]  in  the  extreme  right  of  the  1930s  (’a  complex   galaxy’,   according   to
Winock),[104] and in Vichy (anti-rights of man, personified by super-patriot Pétain, and to
some observers the best example of authentic ‘French fascism’).[105]
McClelland also makes an interesting point  about  inter-tradition  relationships.  He  says
that to link someone like de Maistre (in the late-eighteenth century)  with  fascism  (in  the
mid-twentieth) would be  absurd.  But  he  goes  on  to  claim  that,  in  reality,  there  is  a
connection in  that  both  early-nineteenth  century  conservatives  and  twentieth-century
fascists  were  reacting  to,  and  rebelling  against,  the  French  Revolution  and  ’certain
assumptions about the nature of man and political society.’[106] Likewise,  Steiner  refers
to the way in which counter-revolutionary ideas can emerge ’under the  dubious  aegis  of
proto-fascisms or outright fascism’.[107] We should certainly take this point on board,  for
it is certainly true that relationships may exist where we least expect  them.  Nonetheless,
the fascination of the extreme right lies in the fact that, for most of the time, sub-traditions
have existed in  parallel  with  each  other,  each  with  different  emphases  and  starting-
points.
      Another way of thinking about the whole issue is to conceive  of  a  political  spectrum
with a ‘space’ or ‘void’  on  the  extreme  right  that  has  been  filled  by  a  succession  of
different parties, movements and ideas. The advantage of  this  conceptualisation  lies  in
the fact that it takes account of the  way  in  which  the  extreme  right  has  changed  and
evolved over time. It also stops us trying to  make  erroneous  connections  and  linkages
between extreme-right movements in different eras  –  movements  that,  in  reality,  have
little in common. It is always tempting to think in terms of an extreme-right ‘tradition’,  and
we will do exactly this in the course of our investigation. However, it could also be argued
that every individual or group in France labelled ‘far right’ has been unique, and  has  had
very little in common with previous manifestations of this ’thing’ we call the extreme right.
      Moreover, at times it would seem  to  be  more  accurate  to  talk  in  terms  merely  of
‘protest’ and ‘agitation’ - and forget all notions of a specific type of political  ideology  or  a
full-blown political tradition. But that  is  not  to  deny  the  validity  and  usefulness  of  the
schema put forward by Eatwell & O’Sullivan, Rémond, Sternhell,  Milza,  Soucy,  Sirinelli,
Anderson, Winock, Austin, Petitfils, Hainsworth and McClelland. Indeed, the  frameworks
put forward by these commentators will not only help us  to  focus  on  the  key  issues  in
forthcoming chapters, but will also supply us with a vital point of reference.
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